# LECTURE 1 INTRODUCTION TO CODE-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY DECODING A RANDOM CODE

Summer School: Introduction to Quantum-Safe Cryptography

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# THE TEAM

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#### COURSE CONTENT

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
- 1. An Intractable Problem Related to Codes, Decoding
- 2 Random Codes
- 3. Information Set Decoding (ISD) Algorithms and Duals Attacks
- 4. Duality, Fourier Theory and Decoding Self-Reducibility (Worst-to-Average Case Reduction)
- 5. McEliece and Alekhnovitch Encryption' Schemes (From Original Propositions to Instantiations)
  - $\longrightarrow$  3 lectures notes (long, for further reading): https://arxiv.org/pdf/2304.03541

## **Exercise Sessions:**

- 1. Starting Exercises to Get Familiar with Linear Codes & Crypto
- 2. Programming Session: Implement Basic ISDs and Breaking Challenges
- 3. Advanced Exercises About Code-Based Cryptography and Duality
  - → 2 long exercise sheets: cryptanalyses of code-based encryption schemes


# Code-Based Cryptography?

# AN OLD HISTORY



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Shannon (1948/1949) introduced the following problem (decoding),




Aim:

Recover S

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


 $\longrightarrow$  Matrix  $\boldsymbol{A}$  and vectors  $\boldsymbol{s},\boldsymbol{e}$  are binary (  $\in\mathbb{F}_{2})$ 

# THERE ARE TRAPDOORS (I)!

McEliece (1978):


# **A** ← Trapdoor(): public-key



- With the trapdoor: easy to recover message if e "short" (with few 1, a lot of 0),
- · Without: hard

# THERE ARE TRAPDOORS (II)!





- To encrypt b = 1, send
- u ← Unif


• To encrypt b = 0, send



e with few 1

But how to decrypt?

# YOU SAID CODE?



Understanding what is a linear code: useful to

- 1. build trapdoors
- 2. understand the hardness of decoding

# LINEAR CODES IN THE HISTORY

The first purpose of linear codes was not cryptography. . .

It was telecommunication!

→ Codes are at the core of information theory (and friends)


# LINEAR CODES AND TELECOMMUNICATION

How to transmit *k* bits over a **noisy channel**?

## LINEAR CODES AND TELECOMMUNICATION

# How to transmit *k* bits over a noisy channel?

- 1. Fix C subspace  $\subseteq \mathbb{F}_2^n$  of dimension k
- 2. Map  $(m_1,\ldots,m_k)\longrightarrow \mathbf{c}=(c_1,\ldots,c_n)\in\mathcal{C}$  (adding n-k bits redundancy)
- 3. Send c across the noisy channel



 $\longrightarrow$  from  $c \oplus e$ : how to recover e and then c?

(Decoding Problem)

# HAMMING DISTANCE

Real life scenario: 
$$\mathbf{c} + \mathbf{e}$$
 with  $\mathbf{e} = (e_1, \dots, e_n)$  such that,

$$\forall i \in [1, n], \quad \mathbb{P}(e_i = 1) = p \text{ and } \mathbb{P}(e_i = 0) = 1 - p$$

 $\longrightarrow$  Each bit of **c** is flipped with probability p

# Given a received corrupted word y:

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{c} \text{ was sent} \mid \mathbf{y} \text{ is received}) = p^{d_{\mathsf{H}}(\mathbf{c},\mathbf{y})} (1-p)^{n-d_{\mathsf{H}}(\mathbf{c},\mathbf{y})}$$

where 
$$d_H(\mathbf{c}, \mathbf{y}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sharp \{i \in [1, n] : c_i \neq y_i\}$$
 (Hamming distance)

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 (c was sent | y is received) =  $p^{d_{\mathsf{H}}(\mathbf{c},\mathbf{y})}(1-p)^{n-d_{\mathsf{H}}(\mathbf{c},\mathbf{y})}$ 

where 
$$d_H(\mathbf{c}, \mathbf{y}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sharp \{i \in [1, n] : c_i \neq y_i\}$$
 (Hamming distance)

Any decoding candidate  $\mathbf{c} \in \mathcal{C}$  is even more likely as it is close to the received message  $\mathbf{v}$  for the Hamming distance.

 $\longrightarrow$  It explains why historically the Hamming distance has been the considered metric when dealing with codes. . .

# BASICS ON LINEAR CODES

 $\mathbb{F}_q$ : finite field with q elements

## Linear Code:

A linear code  $\mathcal C$  of length n and dimension  $k\left([n,k]_q\text{-code}\right)$ :

subspace of  $\mathbb{F}_q^n$  of dimension k

# First Examples:

- 1.  $\{(f(x_1), \dots, f(x_n)): f \in \mathbb{F}_q[X] \text{ and } \deg(f) < k\}$  where the  $x_i$ 's are distinct elements of  $\mathbb{F}_q$  is an  $[n, k]_q$ -code
- 2.  $\{(\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}) : \mathbf{u} \in U \text{ and } \mathbf{v} \in V\}$  where U (resp. V) is an  $[n, k_U]_q$ -code (resp.  $[n, k_V]_q$ -code) is an  $[2n, k_U + k_V]_q$ -code

# MINIMUM DISTANCE

# **Hamming Weight:**

Given  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_a^n$ , its Hamming weight is:

$$|\mathbf{x}| \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sharp \left\{ i \in [1, n] : x_i \neq 0 \right\}$$

# Minimum Distance:

The minimum distance of C is:

$$d_{\min}(\mathcal{C}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \min \left\{ |\mathbf{c}| : \mathbf{c} \in \mathcal{C}, \ \mathbf{c} \neq \mathbf{0} \right\}$$

 $d_{\min}(\mathcal{C})$  is an important quantity:

"geometry" of  ${\mathcal C}$  ; "efficiency" of  ${\mathcal C}$  ; "security" of  ${\mathcal C}$ 

# HOW TO REPRESENT A CODE (I)?

$$C$$
 be an  $[n, k]_q$ -code

Basis representation:  $g_1, \ldots, g_k$  basis of C,

$$\mathcal{C} = \left\{\mathsf{mG}: \ \mathsf{m} \in \mathbb{F}_q^k 
ight\}$$
 where the rows of  $\mathsf{G} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{k imes n}$  are the  $\mathsf{g}_i$ 

Reciprocally, any  $\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{k \times n}$  of rank k defines the  $[n,k]_q$ -code,

$$\mathcal{C} \stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=} \left\{ \mathsf{mG}: \; \mathsf{m} \in \mathbb{F}_q^k \right\}$$

## **Generator Matrix:**

G is called a generator matrix

# HOW TO REPRESENT A CODE (II)?

## **Dual Code:**

Given C, its dual  $C^{\perp}$  is the  $[n, n - k]_q$ -code,

$$\mathcal{C}^{\perp} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left\{ \mathbf{c}^{\perp} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n : \ \forall \mathbf{c} \in \mathcal{C}, \ \mathbf{c} \cdot \mathbf{c}^{\perp} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{i=1}^n c_i \ c_i^{\perp} = \mathbf{0} \in \mathbb{F}_q \right\}$$

→ Wait Lecture 4 to understand the rational behind this definition!

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Parity-check representation:  $h_1, \ldots, h_{n-k}$  basis of  $\mathcal{C}^{\perp}$ ,

$$\mathcal{C} = \left\{c \in \mathbb{F}_q^n: \; Hc^\intercal = 0\right\} \text{ where the } \underset{rows}{\text{rows of }} H \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k) \times n} \text{ are the } h_i$$

Reciprocally, any  $H \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k)\times n}$  of rank n-k defines the  $[n,k]_q$ -code,

$$\mathcal{C} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left\{ \mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n : \ \mathbf{H} \mathbf{c}^\mathsf{T} = \mathbf{0} 
ight\}$$

# Parity-Check Matrix:

H is called a parity-check matrix

## A REMARK

- $\bullet \ \ \mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{k \times n} \ \text{generator matrix of} \ \mathcal{C} \ \left(\textit{i.e., } \mathcal{C} = \left\{\mathbf{mG}: \ \mathbf{m} \in \mathbb{F}_q^k\right\}\right), \mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{k \times k} \ \text{non-singular,}$ 
  - $\longrightarrow$  SG still generator matrix of  ${\mathcal C}$

- $\mathbf{H} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k) \times n}$  parity-check matrix of  $\mathcal{C}$  (i.e.,  $\mathcal{C} = \left\{ \mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n : \mathbf{H} \mathbf{c}^\mathsf{T} = \mathbf{0} \right\}$ ),  $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k) \times (n-k)}$  non-singular,
  - $\longrightarrow$  SH still parity-check matrix of  ${\mathcal C}$

# FROM ONE REPRESENTATION TO THE OTHER?

$$\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{k \times n} \text{ generator matrix} \quad \overset{\textbf{easy to compute?}}{\longleftrightarrow} \quad \mathbf{H} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k) \times n} \text{ parity-check matrix}$$

# FROM ONE REPRESENTATION TO THE OTHER?


$$\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{k \times n} \text{ generator matrix} \quad \overset{\textbf{easy to compute?}}{\longleftrightarrow} \quad \mathbf{H} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k) \times n} \text{ parity-check matrix}$$

Yes!

- 1. Show that if  $\mathbf{H} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k) \times n}$  has rank n-k and  $\mathbf{GH^T} = \mathbf{0}$ , then  $\mathbf{H}$  parity-check (exercise)
- 2. Perform a Gaussian elimination:  $SG = (I_k \mid A)$ , then  $H = (-A^T \mid I_{n-k})$  is a parity-check matrix



 $Would \ you \ rather \ choose \ generator \ or \ parity-check \ representation?$ 



 $Would \ you \ rather \ choose \ generator \ or \ parity-check \ representation?$ 

Sorry for the team generator matrix :(

Usually, the parity-check representation is more convenient

Let  $C_{Ham}$  be the [7, 4]<sub>2</sub>-code of generator matrix:

$$\mathbf{G} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\mathbf{H} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

has rank 3 and verifies  $GH^T = 0$ .

Let 
$$\mathbf{c} + \mathbf{e}$$
 where 
$$\begin{cases} \mathbf{c} \in \mathcal{C}_{\text{Ham}} \\ |\mathbf{e}| = 1 \end{cases}$$
: how to easily recover  $\mathbf{e}$ ?

# MODULO THE CODE

#### Given $\mathbf{c} + \mathbf{e}$ : recover $\mathbf{e}$

 $\longrightarrow$  Make modulo  $\mathcal{C}$  to extract the information about **e** 

# Coset Space: $\mathbb{F}_q^n/\mathcal{C}$

$$\text{Given an } [n,k]_q\text{-code }\mathcal{C},\quad \sharp \ \mathbb{F}_q^n/\mathcal{C}=q^{n-k}\quad \text{and}\quad \mathbb{F}_q^n/\mathcal{C}=\left\{\mathbf{x}_i+\mathcal{C}\ :\ 1\leq i\leq q^{n-k}\right\}$$

A natural set of representatives via a parity-check H: syndromes

$$\mathbf{x}_i + \mathcal{C} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n / \mathcal{C} \longmapsto \mathbf{H} \mathbf{x}_i^\mathsf{T} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n-k}$$
 (called a syndrome)

is an isomorphism

# C be an $[n, k]_q$ -code of parity-check matrix H

- $\bullet \ \text{From} \ c + e \text{:} \ \ \mathsf{H}(c + e)^\mathsf{T} = \mathsf{H}c^\mathsf{T} + \mathsf{H}e^\mathsf{T} = \mathsf{H}e^\mathsf{T}$
- From  $He^T$ : compute with linear algebra y s.t

$$Hy^{\intercal} = He^{\intercal} \iff H(y-e)^{\intercal} = 0 \iff y-e \in \mathcal{C} \iff y=c+e$$



# THE WORST-CASE DECODING PROBLEM

Two formulations for the worst-case decoding:

# Problem (Noisy Codeword Decoding):

- Given:  $G \in \mathbb{F}_q^{k \times n}$  of rank  $k, t \in [0, n]$ ,  $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$  where  $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{c} + \mathbf{e}$  with  $\mathbf{c} = \mathbf{m} G$  for some  $\mathbf{m} \in \mathbb{F}_q^k$  and  $|\mathbf{e}| = t$
- Find: e (or equivalently m)

# Problem (Syndrome Decoding):

- Given:  $H \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k)\times n}$  of rank  $n-k, t \in [0, n]$ ,  $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n-k}$  where  $H\mathbf{e}^\mathsf{T} = \mathbf{s}^\mathsf{T}$  with  $|\mathbf{e}| = t$
- Find: e

→ These problems are equivalent!

n length; k dimension; t decoding distance

Let,  $\mathcal{A}$  be an algorithm such that  $\mathcal{A}(\mathsf{G},\mathsf{mG}+\mathsf{e})\longmapsto\mathsf{e}$ 

Given  $(H, He^T)$ : our aim, recover e using A

- 1. Compute with linear algebra **G** (rank k) such that  $\mathbf{GH}^{\mathsf{T}} = \mathbf{0}$
- 2. Compute (again) with linear algebra y such that  $Hy^T = He^T$
- 3. Notice that  $H(y-e)^T=0\iff y-e=mG$  for some  $m\in\mathbb{F}_q^k$
- 4. Feed (G, y) to  $\mathcal{A}$ : it recovers e

Exercise: show that the reciprocal holds

In what follows, we will mainly keep the parity-check representation!

# **NP-COMPLETENESS**

# Worst-Case Decisional Decoding Problem

- Input:  $\mathbf{H} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k) \times n}$ ,  $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n-k}$  where  $n, k \in \mathbb{N}$  with  $k \le n$  and an integer  $t \le n$ .
- Decision: it exists  $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}_a^n$  of Hamming weight t such  $\mathbf{He}^{\mathsf{T}} = \mathbf{s}^{\mathsf{T}}$ ?

This problem is NP-complete

Is it useful?

Be careful of the input set!

# DRAWBACK OF THE NP-COMPLETENESS

The above NP-completeness shows that (if  $P \neq NP$ )

We cannot easily solve the decoding problem for all codes and all decoding distances. . .

→ There are codes for which decoding is hard!

Not a safety guarantee for cryptographic applications!

Is decoding hard for all codes?

No! (remember Hamming code...)

# Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) Codes:

Given 
$$\mathbf{z} \in (\mathbb{F}_q^{\star})^n$$
 and  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$  s.t  $x_i \neq x_j$  (in particular  $n \leq q$ ) and  $k \leq n$ .

The code  $GRS_k(x, z)$  is defined as:

$$\mathrm{GRS}_k(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{z}) \stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=} \Big\{ \Big( z_1 f(x_1), \ \dots, \ z_n f(x_n) \Big) : \ f \in \mathbb{F}_q[X] \ \ \text{and} \ \ \ \mathrm{deg}(f) < k \Big\}$$

---- GRS are used in QR-codes!

**Exercise**:  $GRS_k(x, z)$  has generator matrix:

$$\mathbf{G} \stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & \cdots & 1 \\ x_1 & x_2 & \cdots & x_n \\ x_1^2 & x_2^2 & \cdots & x_n^2 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ x_1^k & x_2^k & \cdots & x_n^k \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} z_1 & & & & 0 \\ & z_2 & & & \\ & & \ddots & & \\ 0 & & & z_n \end{pmatrix}$$

# BERLEKAMP-WELSH ALGORITHM

# Decoding Algorithm:

Given, 
$$\mathsf{GRS}_k(x,z)$$
 and  $c+e$  such that  $\left\{ \begin{array}{c} c \in \mathsf{GRS}_k(x,z) \\ |e| \leq \left\lfloor \frac{n-k}{2} \right\rfloor \end{array} \right.$ 

Then, we can recover (c, e) in polynomial time in the size of inputs, i.e.,  $O(n^{\ell})$  for some  $\ell$ .

→ See Exercise Session

## **IN SUMMARY**

- There are codes for which decoding is hard (NP-Completeness)
- Decoding is easy for some family of codes (for instance Generalized-Reed-Solomon codes)

Is decoding hard for almost all codes?



# THE AVERAGE DECODING PROBLEM

$$Sample: \qquad \qquad H \qquad \longleftarrow \ \, Unif\left(\mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k)\times n}\right), \qquad \qquad \times \qquad \longleftarrow \ \, Unif\left(z:|z|=t\right)$$
 
$$Input: \qquad \qquad H \qquad , \qquad s = \qquad H \qquad \qquad x$$
 
$$Recover: \qquad \qquad e \qquad s.t \qquad H \qquad \qquad e = \qquad s \qquad and \qquad e \in \left\{z:|z|=t\right\}$$

For a fixed R=k/n, with respect to au=t/n, the solution will be unique or not!

Let, 
$$\varepsilon = \mathbb{P}_{H,x} \Big( \mathcal{A}(H,s = xH^T) = e$$
 such that  $|e| = t$  and  $eH^T = s \Big)$ 

# Using the law of total probability:

$$\varepsilon = \frac{1}{q^{k \times (n-k)} \times (q-1)^t \binom{n}{t}} \sum_{\substack{\mathsf{x}_0 \in \mathbb{F}_q^n, \; |\mathsf{x}_0| = t \\ \mathsf{H}_0 \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k) \times n}}} \mathbb{P}\Big(\mathcal{A}(\mathsf{H}_0, \mathsf{s} = \mathsf{x}_0 \mathsf{H}^\mathsf{T}) = \mathsf{e} \; \text{ s.t. } |\mathsf{e}| = \mathsf{t} \; \text{ and } \; \mathsf{e}\mathsf{H}^\mathsf{T} = \mathsf{s}\Big)$$

 $\longrightarrow \varepsilon$  is the average success probability of  ${\mathcal A}$  over all fixed possible inputs

(above probabilities are computed over the internal randomness of  ${\cal A}$ )

#### Consequence:

If arepsilon is negligible, then  ${\mathcal A}$  fails to decode almost all codes

# Exponential Complexity for Decoding in Average:

For all known algorithms  $\mathcal{A}$  (T running time of one iteration  $\mathcal{A}$ )

$$\frac{T}{\varepsilon}=2^{\alpha(q,R,\tau)}\,\,^{n(1+o(1))}$$
 for some  $\alpha(q,R,\tau)\geq 0$ 



Figure 1: Hardness of DP( $n, q, R, \tau$ ) as function of  $\tau$ 

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Figure 1: Hardness of DP( $n, q, R, \tau$ ) as function of  $\tau$ 

- McEliece encryption:  $t = \tau n = \Theta\left(\frac{n}{\log n}\right)$
- ▶ Other encryptions:  $t = \tau n = \Theta(\sqrt{n})$
- Authenticated protocols:  $t = \tau n = Cn$  where C constant quite small
- Wave Signature:  $t = \tau n = Cn$  where C large constant,  $C \approx 0.95$

# AND THE GENERATOR MATRIX REPRESENTATION?

 $\mathsf{DP}'(n,q,R,\tau)$ . Let  $k \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \lfloor Rn \rfloor$  and  $t \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \lfloor \tau n \rfloor$ 

- Input: (G,  $y \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} sG + x$ ) where G, s and x are uniformly distributed over  $\mathbb{F}_q^{k \times n}$ ,  $\mathbb{F}_q^k$  and words of Hamming weight t in  $\mathbb{F}_q^n$ .
- Output: an error  $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$  of Hamming weight t such that  $\mathbf{y} \mathbf{e} = \mathbf{m}\mathbf{G}$  for some  $\mathbf{m} \in \mathbb{F}_q^k$ .

#### **Exercise Session:**

For any algorithm  ${\cal A}$  solving  ${\sf DP}'$  with probability  ${\varepsilon}$  and time  ${\it T}$ :

Describe an algorithm  $\mathcal B$  solving DP in the pprox same time with probability  $\geq \varepsilon - O\left(q^{-\min(k,n-k)}\right)$  (and the reciprocal)

 $\longrightarrow$  Same average hardness with syndromes or noisy codewords formalism!