LECTURE 5 MCELIECE AND ALEKHNOVICH ENCRYPTION' SCHEMES

Summer School: Introduction to Quantum-Safe Cryptography

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
THE OBJECTIVE OF THE DAY

Code-Based Encryption Schemes

- McEliece ('78)
- Alekhnovich ('03)

COURSE OUTLINE

- McEliece's Public-Key Encryption Scheme
- How to Rely the Encryption Security on only DP: Alekhnovich's Approach
- Search-to-Decision Reduction
- Modern Instantiations of Alekhnovich's Approach




MCELIECE'S ENCRYPTION

MCELIECE IN A NUTSHELL

McEliece (1978):

A ← Trapdoor(): public-key



- With the trapdoor: easy to recover message if e "short" (with few 1, a lot of 0),
- Without: hard

BE CAREFUL

What is a trapdoor in McEliece's approach?

MCELIECE'S ENCRYPTION

Key Generation:

• $(G_{pk}, t, 7) \leftarrow Trappdoor()$ where G_{pk} represents a code such that,

$$(mG_{pk} + e, T) \xrightarrow{easy} m (if |e| \le t)$$

- Secret Key: T
- Public Key: (G_{pk}, t)

Encryption of m with Public-Key:

Pick random
$$e \in \{z \ : \ |z| = t\}$$
 and output as ciphertext
$$mG_{nk} + e$$

Decryption of $mG_{pk} + e$:

Use T to compute

$$(mG_{pk} + e, T) \longrightarrow m$$

AN INSTANTIATION OF MCELIECE

Berlekamp-Welsh Algorithm:

Codes that we know how to decode: $GRS_k(x, z)$

• Public Key: a representation of $GRS_k(x, z)$

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & \cdots & 1 \\ x_1 & x_2 & \cdots & x_n \\ x_1^2 & x_2^2 & \cdots & x_n^2 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ x_1^k & x_2^k & \cdots & x_n^k \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} z_1 & & & 0 \\ & z_2 & & \\ & & \ddots & \\ 0 & & & z_n \end{pmatrix}$$

· Secret Key:

What is the secret key? Can we give the above matrix as a public key?

Berlekamp-Welsh Algorithm:

Codes that we know how to decode: $GRS_h(x, z)$

• Public Key: a representation of $GRS_k(x, z)$

$$\mathbf{G_{pk}} = \mathbf{S} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & \cdots & 1 \\ x_1 & x_2 & \cdots & x_n \\ x_1^2 & x_2^2 & \cdots & x_n^2 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ x_1^k & x_2^k & \cdots & x_n^k \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} z_1 & & & 0 \\ & z_2 & & \\ & & \ddots & \\ 0 & & & z_n \end{pmatrix} \text{ where \mathbf{S} non-singular picks random basis }$$

• Secret Key: T = (x, z)

Is the security of this scheme well-identified? Does it reduce to well identified problems?

AN INSTANTIATION OF MCELIECE

Berlekamp-Welsh Algorithm:

Codes that we know how to decode: $GRS_k(x, z)$

• Public Key: a representation of GRS_k(x, z)

$$\mathbf{G_{pk}} = \mathbf{S} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & \cdots & 1 \\ x_1 & x_2 & \cdots & x_n \\ x_1^2 & x_2^2 & \cdots & x_n^2 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ x_1^k & x_2^k & \cdots & x_n^k \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} z_1 & & & 0 \\ & z_2 & & \\ & & \ddots & \\ 0 & & & z_n \end{pmatrix} \text{ where } \mathbf{S} \text{ non-singular picks random basis }$$

• Secret Key: T = (x, z)

Is the security of this scheme well-identified? Does it reduce to well identified problems?

Yes!

SECURITY REDUCTION

McEliece's Encryption:

pk: G_{pk} representation of a code and sk: a trapdoor T

The security of McEliece relies on 2 assumptions:

- 1. The hardness of DP,
- 2. We can't distinguish G_{pk} and G_{u} (uniform).

But how to prove this statement?

Computational Distance:

Given two random variables X_0 , X_1 and T.

$$\Delta_{\mathbb{C}}(X_0,X_1)(T) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \max_{\mathcal{A}: \ |\mathcal{A}| \leq T} \left\{ \mathbb{P}_{X_0} \left(\mathcal{A}(X_0) = 0 \right) - \mathbb{P}_{X_1} \left(\mathcal{A}(X_1) = 1 \right) \right\}$$

where $|\mathcal{A}|$ denotes the running-time of the algorithm \mathcal{A} .

Security Reduction of McEliece's Encryption:

Given G_{nk} be distributed as a public-key in McEliece's encryption and G_u being uniform with the same size.

$$\max_{|\mathcal{A}| \leq \textit{T}} \left\{ \mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}\left(G_{pk}, mG_{pk} + e\right) = m\right) \right\} \leq \Delta_{\mathbb{C}}\left(G_{pk}, G_{\textit{u}}\right) \left(\textit{T}\right) + \underbrace{\max_{|\mathcal{A}| \leq \textit{T}} \left\{ \mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}\left(G_{\textit{u}}, mG_{\textit{u}} + e\right) = e\right) \right\}}_{\text{solving decoding problem}}$$

 G_{nk} is computationally indistinguishable from G_{u} , is equivalent to

$$\Delta_{\mathcal{C}}\left(G_{pk},G_{u}\right)$$
 (T) is small

Proof.

Let \mathcal{A} be an algorithm breaking McEliece.

1. We Claim:

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}\left(G_{pk}, mG_{pk} + e\right) = m\right) \leq \Delta_{C}\left(G_{pk}, G_{u}\right) + \mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}\left(G_{u}, mG_{u} + e\right) = m\right)$$

Let us design \mathcal{B} an algorithm to distinguish G_{pk} and G_{pk} with the help of \mathcal{A}

- Given G
- (i) We pick a uniform m and e with Hamming weight t
- (ii) We feed $(G_7, mG_7 + e)$ to A
- (iii) If the answer is m, we decide that G_{pk} were given, otherwise G_{u}

We have.

$$\begin{split} \mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{B}\left(G_{pk}\right) = \text{``pk''}\right) &= \mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}\left(G_{pk}, mG_{pk} + e\right) = m\right) \\ \mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{B}\left(G_{u}\right) = \text{``pk''}\right) &= \mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}\left(G_{u}, mG_{u} + e\right) = m\right) \end{split}$$

Proof.

Let \mathcal{A} be an algorithm breaking McEliece.

1. We Claim:

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}\left(G_{pk}, mG_{pk} + e\right) = m\right) \leq \Delta_{C}\left(G_{pk}, G_{u}\right) + \mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}\left(G_{u}, mG_{u} + e\right) = m\right)$$

Let us design \mathcal{B} an algorithm to distinguish G_{nk} and G_{nk} with the help of \mathcal{A}

- Given G
- (i) We pick a uniform m and e with Hamming weight t
- (ii) We feed $(G_7, mG_7 + e)$ to A
- (iii) If the answer is m, we decide that G_{DK} were given, otherwise G_{U}

We have.

$$\begin{split} \mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{B}\left(G_{pk}\right) = \text{``pk''}\right) &= \mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}\left(G_{pk}, mG_{pk} + e\right) = m\right) \\ \mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{B}\left(G_{u}\right) = \text{``pk''}\right) &= \mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}\left(G_{u}, mG_{u} + e\right) = m\right) \end{split}$$

But at the same time,

$$\left|\mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{B}\left(\mathsf{G}_{\mathsf{pk}}\right) = \text{``pk''}\right) - \mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{B}\left(\mathsf{G}_{\mathsf{u}}\right) = \text{``pk''}\right)\right| \leq \Delta_{\mathcal{C}}\left(\mathsf{G}_{\mathsf{pk}}, \mathsf{G}_{\mathsf{u}}\right) (7)$$

Proof.

Let \mathcal{A} be an algorithm breaking McEliece.

1. We Claim:

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}\left(G_{pk}, mG_{pk} + e\right) = m\right) \leq \Delta_{C}\left(G_{pk}, G_{u}\right) + \mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}\left(G_{u}, mG_{u} + e\right) = m\right)$$

Let us design \mathcal{B} an algorithm to distinguish G_{nk} and G_{nk} with the help of \mathcal{A}

- Given G
- (i) We pick a uniform m and e with Hamming weight t
- (ii) We feed $(G_7, mG_7 + e)$ to A
- (iii) If the answer is m, we decide that G_{DK} were given, otherwise G_{U}

We have.

$$\begin{split} \mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{B}\left(G_{pk}\right) = \text{``pk''}\right) &= \mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}\left(G_{pk}, mG_{pk} + e\right) = m\right) \\ \mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{B}\left(G_{U}\right) = \text{``pk''}\right) &= \mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}\left(G_{U}, mG_{U} + e\right) = m\right) \end{split}$$

But at the same time,

$$\left|\mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{B}\left(\mathsf{G}_{pk}\right)=\text{``pk''}\right)-\mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{B}\left(\mathsf{G}_{u}\right)=\text{``pk''}\right)\right|\leq\Delta_{C}\left(\mathsf{G}_{pk},\mathsf{G}_{u}\right)\left(T\right)$$

2. It concludes the proof as

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{B}\left(G_{u}\right)=\text{``pk''}\right)=\mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}\left(G_{u},mG_{u}+e\right)=m\right)\leq\max_{|\mathcal{A}|\leq T}\left\{\mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}\left(G_{u},mG_{u}+e\right)=e\right)\right\} \quad \Box$$

PLENTY OF INSTANTIATION, AND ATTACKS...

Can we distinguish the public code from a random one?

Be extremely careful. . .

We believe in the hardness of DP.

but, when instantiating McEliece with codes equipped with a decoding algorithm:

these codes have to be indistinguishable from random codes

→ Many family of codes were historically proposed to instantiate McEliece's encryption

Many were broken. . .

- ► Generalized Reed-Solomon codes (see Exercise Session)
- Convolutional codes
- Polar codes
- ► LDPC codes
- ▶ etc...

ORIGINAL MCELIECE'S INSTANTIATION: GOPPA CODES (I)

Alternant Codes:

Let k, n, m such that $n \leq q^m$, $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n$ where the x_i 's are distinct.

We define the alternant code A(x, y) as,

$$\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y})\stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=} \mathsf{GRS}_k(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y})\cap \mathbb{F}_q^n$$

→ Alternant codes belong to the class of algebraic codes!

Decoding Alternant Codes:

 \longrightarrow Goppa codes are a particular case of alternant codes!

ORIGINAL MCELIECE'S INSTANTIATION: GOPPA CODES (I)

Goppa Codes:

Given some polynomial $G \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}[X]$, its associated Goppa codes is defined as

$$\Gamma(G, \mathbf{x}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$$
 where $\forall i \in [1, n], y_i = \frac{G(x_i)}{\prod_{i \neq j} (x_i - x_j)}$

- → Goppa Codes enjoy many interesting properties!
- ▶ We can decode them at twice the Berlekamp-Welsh decoding distance
- ▶ They behave as random codes for their weight distribution and minimum distance

Goppa Codes in Cryptography:

Since their introduction by McEliece for cryptography in '78, we did not succeed to design an efficient algorithm to distinguish between Goppa and random codes

(except when Goppa codes have rate very close to 1)

MCELIECE WITH PARITY-CHECK MATRICES (I)

McEliece historically described his scheme with generator matrices

Does it work with parity-check matrices?

MCELIECE WITH PARITY-CHECK MATRICES (I)

McEliece historically described his scheme with generator matrices

Does it work with parity-check matrices?

→ Yes! It is often referred to as Niederreiter's approach

MCELIECE WITH PARITY-CHECK MATRICES (II)

Key Generation:

• $(H_{pk}, t, 7) \leftarrow Trappdoor()$ where H_{pk} represents a code such that,

$$(H_{pk}e^{\top}, T) \xrightarrow{easy} e (if |e| \le t)$$

- Secret Key: T
- Public Key: (H_{pk}, t)

Encryption of m with Public-Key:

We first encode **m** as $e(m) \in \{z : |z| = t\}$ via a public encoding and then output as ciphertext $H_{pk}e(m)^{\top}$

Decryption of $H_{pk}e^{\top}$:

Use T to compute

$$(H_{pk}e(m)^{\top}, T) \longrightarrow e(m) \longrightarrow m$$

A BAD (BUT ORIGINAL) PRESENTATION OF MCELIECE

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McEliece_cryptosystem

A BAD (BUT ORIGINAL) PRESENTATION OF MCELIECE

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McEliece_cryptosystem

There are no permutations in McEliece cryptosystem

COMPARISON OF BOTH APPROACHES

About the Security:

- ▶ Both representations of the scheme have the same security
 - The decoding problem with parity-check of generator matrices is the same problem
 - If you can distinguish between G_{pk} and G_u, then you can distinguish between H_{pk} and H_u
 because you can compute a generator from a parity-check matrix and reciprocally

About the Public-Key Size:

► Public-keys in generator or parity-check matrix can generically be represented with the same amount of bits. We can put them in "systematic form"

$$\mathsf{G}_{\mathsf{pk}} = (\mathsf{I}_k \mid \mathsf{A}) \text{ where } \mathsf{A} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{k \times (n-k)} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathsf{H}_{\mathsf{pk}} = (\mathsf{I}_{n-k} \mid \mathsf{B}) \text{ where } \mathsf{A} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k) \times k}$$

$$\longrightarrow \mathsf{It requires } k \times (n-k) \times \mathsf{log}_2 \ q \text{ bits!}$$

Ciphertext Length

▶ With generator matrices, a ciphertext has length $n \times \log_2 q$ while with parity-check matrices it has length $(n - k) \times \log_2 q$

In McEliece scheme, keys are large: $k \times (n - k) \times \log_2 q$ bits

How to reduce key-sizes?

→ use a quasi-cvclic structure!

Quasi-Cyclic Codes:

- 1. First we identify $\mathbf{h} \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \cong \sum_{i=1}^n h_i X^{i-1} \in \mathbb{F}[X]/(X^n+1)$
- 2. A Quasi-Cyclic code with ℓ -blocks is a code admitting as basis

$$\begin{pmatrix} g_1 & g_2 & \dots & g_\ell \\ \circlearrowright & \circlearrowright & \dots & \circlearrowright \end{pmatrix}$$

where we often identify vectors $\mathbf{g}_i \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ as polynomials in $\mathbb{F}_2[X]/(X^n+1)$

 \longrightarrow Only one vector is necessary to represent a quasi-cyclic code!

Issue:

When using these codes in McEliece, we don't reduce the security to the hardness of the decoding problem of a random code, but the hardness of decoding a random quasi cyclic code and less is known about this problem...

CONCLUSION ABOUT MCELIECE APPROACH

- Two equivalent representations of McEliece's encryption: using parity-check or generator matrices
 - → Ciphers are shorter with the parity-check representation
- Security relies on decoding a random code and distinguishing the public code from a random
 - → Be cautious when choosing a code that you know how to decode: the basis that you give as public-key as be random looking
- ▶ Public-keys are huge instead you add some algebraic structure like quasi-cyclic
 - \longrightarrow But it decreases the security by not relying on the hardness of decoding a random code

Two McEliece encryptions on the verge for standardization by American government (NIST)

- Classic McEliece: it uses Goppa codes as originally proposed by McEliece
- Bike: its uses quasi-cyclic MDPC codes

ALEKHNOVICH'S ENCRYPTION



McEliece security is **not only** relying on the hardness of decoding a random code

Do we know code-based encryptions whose security only relies on the hardness of a decoding a random code?

FIRST ALEKHNOVICH'S ENCRYPTION

Key Generation
$$(a \cdot b = \sum_i a_i b_i)$$
:

- 1. Choose $\mathbf{A} \in \{0,1\}^{k \times n}$ at random and $\mathbf{e} \in \{0,1\}^n$ with few one
- 2. Compute the space $C_{pk} = \text{Span}(C, e)^{\perp}$
- 3. Secret Key: ${f e}$; Public Key: ${\cal C}_{pk}$

To encrypt a bit $b \in \{0,1\}$ with the public key:

- If b=0, choose $\mathbf{c}\in\mathcal{C}_{pk}$ and $\mathbf{e}'\in\{0,1\}^n$ with few one. Send: $\mathbf{c}+\mathbf{e}'$
- If b = 1, choose $\mathbf{u} \in \{0, 1\}^n$ uniformly. Send: \mathbf{u}

To decrypt a received word $y \in \{0, 1\}^n$:

Compute

$$y \cdot e = \begin{cases} (c + e') \cdot e = \underbrace{c \cdot e}_{=0 \text{ as } c \perp e} + e' \cdot e = 0 \text{ with prob.} \approx 1 \text{ as } e, e' \text{ have few one} \\ u \cdot e = a \text{ random bit} \end{cases}$$

→ To be successful: the encryption of a bits needs to be repeated a few number of times

WHAT ABOUT THE SECURITY?

If you want to decrypt without the secret-key

 \longrightarrow Distinguish between between u uniform and c + e where |e| is small

Solving this problem does not amount to solve the average decoding problem. . .



AVERAGE DECISIONAL DECODING PROBLEM

 $DDP(n, q, R, \tau), k \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lfloor Rn \rfloor \text{ and } t \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lfloor \tau n \rfloor.$

- ► Distributions:
 - \mathcal{D}_0 : (G, u) be uniformly distributed over $\mathbb{F}_q^{k \times n} \times \mathbb{F}_q^n$.
 - \mathcal{D}_1 : (G, mG + e) where G, m, e being uniformly distributed over $\mathbb{F}_q^{k \times n}$, \mathbb{F}_q^k and words of Hamming weight t
 - Input: (H, s) distributed according to \mathcal{D}_b where $b \in \{0, 1\}$ is uniform,
- Decision: $b' \in \{0, 1\}$.

Is this problem strictly easier than its search version?

→ No! They are equivalent (Goldreich-Levin hardcore predicate)

How to define the "efficiency" of an algorithm solving the average decision decoding problem (DDP)?

Advantage:

The DDP(n, R, τ)-advantage of an algorithm \mathcal{A} is defined as:

$$Adv^{\text{DDP}(n,R,\tau)}(\mathcal{A}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \tfrac{1}{2} \left(\mathbb{P} \left(\mathcal{A}(\mathsf{H},\mathsf{s}) = 1 \mid b = 1 \right) - \mathbb{P} \left(\mathcal{A}(\mathsf{H},\mathsf{s}) = 1 \mid b = 0 \right) \right)$$

where the probabilities are computed over the internal randomness of \mathcal{A} , a uniform $b \in \{0,1\}$ and inputs be distributed according to \mathcal{D}_b which is defined in DDP(n,R,τ)

→ Any algorithm solving DDP can be turned into an algorithm solving DP?

Theorem:

Let $\mathcal A$ be a probabilistic algorithm running in time T(n) whose DDP (n,R,τ) -advantage is given by $\varepsilon(n)$ and let $\ell(n) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \log(1/\varepsilon(n))$. Then it exists an algorithm $\mathcal A'$ that solves DDP (n,R,τ) in time $O(n^2\ell(n)^3)T(n)$ and with probability $\Omega(\varepsilon(n)^2)$

But how to prove this statement?

→ It basically relies on the following statement

Goldreich-Levin Hardcore Predicate

Let $f: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$, \mathcal{A} be a probabilistic algorithm running in time $\mathcal{T}(n)$ and $\varepsilon(n) \in (0,1)$ be such that

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}(f(\mathbf{x}),\mathbf{r})=\mathbf{x}\cdot\mathbf{r}\right)=\tfrac{1}{2}+\varepsilon$$

where the probability is computed over the internal coins of \mathcal{A} , \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{r} that are uniformly distributed over $\{0,1\}^n$. Let $\ell(n) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \log(1/\varepsilon(n))$. Then, it exists an algorithm \mathcal{A}' running in time $O(n^2\ell(n)^3T(n))$ that satisfies

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}'(\mathit{f}(x)=x)\right)=\Omega\left(\varepsilon^2\right)$$

where the probability is computed over the internal coins of \mathcal{A}^\prime and x

How to Prove this Statement?

The answer is not so hard! Crucial remark:

$$\mathcal{A}(f(\mathbf{x}), \mathbf{r}) = \mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{r} + e \text{ where } \mathbb{P}(e = 1) = 1/2 - \varepsilon(n)$$

Therefore, recovering \boldsymbol{x} with the help of $\boldsymbol{\mathcal{A}}$ amount to decode

$$\mathbf{x}_n\left(\mathbf{r}_{(1)}^{\top}\mid \ldots\mid \mathbf{r}_{(N)}^{\top}\right)+\left(e_1,\ldots,e_N\right)$$
 where $\mathbb{P}(e_i=1)=1/2-\varepsilon<1/2$ (not uniform noise)

On Board

MODERN INSTANTIATIONS OF ALEKHNOVICH

► Though Alekhnovich's cryptosystem is proved to be secure under the hardness of the average decoding problem, it is not efficient

 \longrightarrow *n* (few thousand) bits to encrypt one bit. . .

► It exists a second Alekhnovich's cryptosystem also proved to be secure under the hardness of the average decoding problem but efficient

 $\longrightarrow O(n)$ bits to encrypt n bits!

CONCLUSION

Many other topics:

- · Code-based primitives like signatures,
- Change the Hamming metric (for instance rank metric)
- Code-based cryptography and algebra (for instance polynomial rings via function fields)
- ...

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- · Code-based primitives like signatures,
- Change the Hamming metric (for instance rank metric)
- Code-based cryptography and algebra (for instance polynomial rings via function fields)
- ...

Thank You!