

# **Lattice Cryptography**


## **(1. Public Key Encryption)**

Vadim Lyubashevsky

IBM Research Europe, Zurich


# Cryptography

Allows for secure communication in the presence of malicious parties




# Cryptography

Large increase in the adversary's computing power  
requires only a small increase in the key size



# Cryptography

A quantum computer is outside the standard model of computation for efficiency purposes




# Symmetric-Key Cryptography




# Symmetric-Key Cryptography


Will still exist if quantum computers are built



# Public-Key Cryptography



# Public-Key Cryptography





# Mathematical Assumptions for Public-Key Cryptography

~~Factoring is hard~~

$$\del N = pq$$

~~Computing discrete logs is hard~~

$$\del g^x = y \pmod p$$



Mostly problems from number theory

All broken once a quantum computer is built

# Consequence of quantum computing

Current public key schemes will be broken

Quantum computers will recover all of **today's** secrets



# Do not need quantum to defend against quantum

Quantum computers are not all-powerful.

They simply solve some problems faster.

Base cryptography on problems they don't solve.

How do we know that (quantum) computers don't solve a problem?

We don't ... all we can say is that researchers tried to solve the problem for X decades and failed.

# Effect of quantum computers

- Symmetric Cryptography
  - Mostly fine
- Public-Key Cryptography
  - Everything used today – broken!


Timeline for change to Quantum-Safe (post-quantum) Crypto:

Algorithm Selection: 2017 – 2022


Writing Standards: 2022 – 2024

Transition should be complete (NSA): 2030-2035


# Public-Key Encryption



# Public-Key Encryption



# What is Secure Encryption?







# Public Key Cryptography


MEET ME IN ICELAND



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AWYXUEOEPEPEK




# Formal Definition

For any two messages  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  of the adversary's choosing, he cannot **distinguish** between

- $c_1 = \text{Enc}(m_1)$
- $c_2 = \text{Enc}(m_2)$

Encryption needs to be randomized

# Building Cryptography



# Lattice Cryptography

- NIST had a competition to create new quantum-safe cryptographic standards
- RSA / Discrete Log / Elliptic Curve cryptography will be phased out by 2033 (at least in the US government)
- Main 2 standards - encryption and digital signature - selected are lattice-based  
(CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium)

# Learning with Errors Problem

# Hard Problem Intuition

$$\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{A} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{y} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{z} \end{pmatrix} \pmod{p}$$

Given  $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{z})$ , find  $\mathbf{y}$

Easy! Just invert  $\mathbf{A}$  and multiply by  $\mathbf{z}$

# Hard Problem Intuition


$$\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{A} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{y} \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{e} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{z} \end{pmatrix} \pmod{p}$$

Small coefficients

Given  $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{z})$ , find  $(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{e})$

Seems hard.

# Hard Problem Intuition (Learning **W**ith **E**rrors)



Small coefficients to enforce uniqueness

Given  $(A, z)$ , find  $(y, e)$


Seems hard.



# Why is this “Lattice” Crypto?

All solutions  $\begin{pmatrix} y \\ e \end{pmatrix}$  to  $\mathbf{A}y + \mathbf{e} = \mathbf{z} \pmod p$  form a “shifted” lattice.

We want to find the point closest to the origin (BDD Problem).



# Distinguishing from Random is also Hard

Search LWE Problem: Given  $(A, t=As+e \text{ mod } p)$ , find  $s$

Decision LWE Problem: Given either  $(A, t=As+e \text{ mod } p)$  or  $(A, u)$ , where  $u$  is random mod  $p$ , figure out which tuple you have

$$\begin{pmatrix} A \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} y \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} e \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} z \end{pmatrix} \text{ mod } p$$

Looks Random mod  $p$




# Public Key Encryption from LWE

# “Column” LWE is Pseudorandom


$$\begin{array}{cccc|c} 4 & 6 & 7 & 9 & 1 \\ 3 & 9 & 0 & 7 & 1 \\ 8 & 4 & 6 & 5 & 0 \\ 1 & 6 & 4 & 3 & 1 \end{array} + \begin{array}{c} 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{array} = \begin{array}{c} 0 \\ 9 \\ 8 \\ 0 \end{array}$$

# “Row” LWE is also Pseudorandom



# Encryption Scheme

Secret Key




$\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n}$



Small  
Coeffs.

Public Key

$A$  is random










# Encryption Scheme



Is pseudo-random based on the hardness  
of the Learning with Errors Problem










# Encryption Scheme











# Encryption Scheme



# Encryption Scheme



represent 0 by  $m=0$   
 represent 1 by  $m=(p-1)/2$

Encrypts only 1 bit – large ciphertext expansion  
 1 bit requires  $n$  elements in  $Z_p$

# Decryption Error

Public Key:  $A$ ,  $t = As + e$

Ciphertext:  $u = rA + e_1$ ,  $v = rt + e_2 + m(p/2)$

Decryption:  $v - us = r(As + e) + e_2 + m(p/2) - (rA + e_1)s$   
 $= re + e_2 + m(p/2) - e_1s$

Need the total error  $re + e_2 - e_1s$  to be  $< p/4$

(let's ignore  $e_2$ , since it's just an integer)

Say each coefficient of  $s$ ,  $r$ ,  $e$ ,  $e_1$ ,  $e_2$  is uniformly random in  $\{-1, 0, 1\}$ ,  
how do you make sure that the inequality is satisfied?

# Decryption Error

- Can set  $p$  large enough so that  $\text{re} - e_1$ s to be  $< p/4 - 1$ 
  - If the length of the vectors is  $n$ , then the maximum value is  $2n$
  - But intuitively, we expect the value to be around  $\sqrt{n}$
  - So we will set  $p$  unnecessarily large
- Can use various inequalities (e.g. Chernoff, Hoeffding) and get closer to  $\sqrt{n}$
- But we can do this much easier and more precisely

# Decryption Error via Convolution

- Let's look at  $re = \sum r_i e_i$  as the sum of  $n$  *independent* random variables
- What's the distribution of  $r_i e_i$  ?
  - $\Pr[-1] = 2/9$
  - $\Pr[0] = 5/9$
  - $\Pr[1] = 2/9$
- Write it as the polynomial  $p(X) = (2/9)X^{-1} + (5/9)X^0 + (2/9)X^1$
- What's the distribution of  $r_i e_i + r_j e_j$  ?
- Compute the product  $P(X) * P(X)$  and read off the coefficients!
- $\Pr[r_i e_i + r_j e_j = c] =$  the coefficient of  $X^c$  in  $P(X) * P(X)$
- So  $\Pr[re - e_1 s = c] =$  the coefficient of  $X^c$  in  $P(X)^{2n}$

# Problem Session

1. Implement the Encryption scheme:
  - $p=257$
  - Dimensions of  $A = 64 \times 64$
  - distribution of  $s, e, r, e_1, e_2$  is Binomial: i.e. each coefficient is  $b_0 + b_1 - b_2 - b_3$  ( $b_i$  are bits)
2. Write a script to compute the decryption error

# Plan for the Week

1. Improve efficiency by working with polynomial rings
2. Number Theory Transform (like FFT)
3. Intro to Zero-Knowledge Proofs
4. Digital Signatures
5. Connection of these Constructions to Geometric Lattices

# Supplementary Reading

<https://github.com/VadimLyubash/LatticeTutorial/>

(Today covered pages 1- 8)